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Credit and Human Welfare: Lessons
from Microcredit in Developing Nations
Alan M. White*
Abstract
Deregulation of usury laws, in the United States and in
developing nations, has permitted various forms of small loans to
be made to the poor and the working class, sometimes at very high
prices. In the case of credit, more is not always better. A human
development approach to evaluating the welfare impacts of credit
products for the poor asks these questions: does a credit product or
program increase income or consumption, achieve savings through
investment in capital goods, or smooth consumption and avert
crises, all at a reasonable cost? Or does the credit on balance
redistribute income away from the poor, without adequate
offsetting benefits, or produce overindebtedness and declining
borrower living standards?
The model of successful small-loan programs that may
enhance the welfare of the poor is the work of the Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh. Grameen Bank’s microlending, savings, and
insurance programs seem to have been effective in improving the
lives of some Grameen borrowers. On the other hand, the
experiences of South Africa and Bolivia with rapid expansion of
microcredit were more problematic, resulting in crises of
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overindebtedness and, in the case of Bolivia, a social revolt by
borrowers. Even after the crisis in Bolivia, however, some
microlenders and their borrowers fared better. The experiences in
these different contexts, as well as the United States’ experience
with payday lending, offer important insights into the benefits
and risks of different credit products and programs for the poor.
These insights can inform the next generation of consumer credit
regulation, which should promote responsible lending based on
full credit reporting, insurance, workouts to protect against and
mitigate
defaults,
continual
repayment
of
principal,
differentiation based on credit use, and simple and transparent
pricing.
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I. Introduction
How do we know when access to credit improves or harms
consumer welfare? Can legal rules improve the aggregate welfare
effects of small loans? The poor need credit and have always
borrowed. At the same time, credit, especially in the form of small
loans and credit cards, has led to national crises for developing
countries and increased poverty and exclusion for overindebted
individuals in developed nations. Lending to the poor has always
posed a moral dilemma.1 Legal rules, particularly usury and
bankruptcy laws, have struggled to find a balance between
preventing exploitation while permitting and encouraging
responsible credit access. Despite decades, even centuries, of legal
experimentation, the story of credit for the poor remains a tale of
feast or famine—overindebtedness and exploitation coexist with
vast unmet needs for credit.2 While bankruptcy and debt-relief
systems play a role in mediating this duality of credit and debt,3
regulators struggle with how to and even whether to regulate
credit markets ex ante, to encourage the benefits the unregulated
market fails to achieve, and to mitigate the harms the
unregulated market causes. In the United States, the new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has been tasked with
rationalizing our system of credit regulation, relying on research
and cost-benefit analysis.4
1. See Exodus 22:25 (“If you lend money to any of my people with you who
is poor, you shall not be to him as a creditor and you shall not exact interest
from him.”); QHURAN, Al-Baqarah 2:275–80 (condemning to hell those who
engage in usury against the poor).
2. See generally CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR (Patrick Bolton & Howard
Rosenthal eds., 2005).
3. See Adam Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy as Development Policy, 39
SETON HALL L. REV. 63, 68 (2009) (arguing that consumer bankruptcy can work
to promote growth and development).
4. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1031–1032, 124 Stat. 1376, 2005–07 (governing
unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices and disclosure to consumers of the costs,
benefits, and risks associated with financial products and services); see also
Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd–Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to
Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 921 (2011)
(explaining the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s powers
to regulate disclosure of the costs, benefits, and risks of financial products and
services).
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Extensive empirical research literature has developed
around the welfare impacts of microlending in the developing
world.5 Similar literature has also emerged debating the benefits
and harms of payday and “fringe” lending in the United States.6
While payday lending and microenterprise credit are conceptually
distinct, they can serve as product substitutes, and, more
importantly, similar issues arise in attempts to weigh their costs
and benefits. The experiences of different nations with microloans
to the poor and the extensive research on both consumer and
microenterprise lending can offer insights for regulators seeking
to craft a fair and effective regulatory structure for small-loan
credit. The welfare impacts of microlending are clearly mixed, but
existing research offers some empirical insights about loan
5. See, e.g., BEATRIZ ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE
ECONOMICS OF MICROFINANCE 199–229 (2005); Jonathan Morduch, The
Microfinance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1569 (1999); John Weiss &
Heather Montgomery, Great Expectations: Microfinance and Poverty Reduction
in Latin America and Asia (ADB Inst. Discussion Paper No. 15, 2004). For links
to numerous studies, see the Microcredit Summit Campaign Commissioned
Papers, Microcredit Summit Campaign, http://www.microcreditsummit.org
/commissioned_papers (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
6. See, e.g., John P. Caskey, Payday Lending: New Research and the Big
Question (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 10-32, 2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1696019;
Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday
Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ L. REV. 563 (2010); Lynn Drysdale &
Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace:
The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the
Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589 (2000); Iain Ramsay,
The Alternative Consumer Credit Market and Financial Sector: Regulatory
Issues and Approaches, 35 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 325 (2001); Michael A. Stegman
& Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model That Encourages Chronic
Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8 (2003); Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In
Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military Personnel Performance (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 08-18, Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jzinman/Papers/PayDay_AirForce_aug08.pdf; Mark
Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price?
(FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Res. Working Paper No. 2005–09, 2005), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-09_Flannery_
Samolyk.pdf; Leslie Parrish & Uriah King, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Phantom
Demand: Short-Term Due Date Generates Need for Repeat Payday Loans,
Accounting for 76% of Total Volume (July 9, 2009), http://www.responsible
lending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-demand-short-term-due-dategenerates-need-for-repeat-payday-loans-accounting-for-76-of-total-volume.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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characteristics that are more or less likely to result in net
borrower benefits.
In the United States, the Community Reinvestment Act,7 and
the community economic development movement more broadly,8
promote lending to low-income individuals and in low-income
communities as a positive, and even essential, tool for improving
the welfare of the poor. On the other hand, consumer and civil
rights advocates decry the debt treadmill created by payday
lenders9 who make small loans to low- and moderate-income
borrowers and predatory mortgage lending that strips wealth
from low-income and minority families.10 Congress and the states
have also passed laws restricting high-cost mortgage and
consumer loan pricing and terms because of the perceived
harmful effects on consumer welfare.11
7. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006); see also Richard D. Marsico, Enforcing the
Community Reinvestment Act: An Advocate’s Guide to Making the CRA Work for
Communities, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 129, 129 (July 2001) (providing a
guide to community investment advocates for using the Consumer
Reinvestment Act to increase lending in their neighborhoods).
8. See JULIA ANN PARZEN & MICHAEL HALL KIESCHNICK, CREDIT WHERE IT’S
DUE: DEVELOPMENT BANKING FOR COMMUNITIES 10–27 (1992) (explaining the
importance of access to credit to community economic development); Susan R.
Jones, Current Issues in the Changing Roles and Practices of Community
Economic Development Lawyers, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 437, 468 (noting that
changes in the community economic development field have expanded the role of
public interest lawyers, increasing the need for advanced legal services).
9. Parrish & King, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that a majority of payday
borrowers must take out a new loan soon after repaying the prior loan because
the repayment left them insufficient funds); Stegman & Faris, supra note 6, at
19 (noting the “explosive growth of payday lending as a source of short-term
consumer credit in low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities”).
10. See DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING,
DEREGULATION AND THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 133–54
(2009) (discussing the costs of high-risk lending to low-income borrowers);
Debbie Gruenstein Bocian et al., Center for Responsible Lending, Foreclosures
by Race and Ethnicity: The Demographics of a Crisis (2010), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosure
s-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf (arguing that the public sector’s failure with respect
to the 2008 subprime mortgage collapse “was its inability or unwillingness to
adequately address predatory lending practices, not in its support of lending to
historically underserved communities”).
11. See, e.g., Homeownership Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), 15
U.S.C.A. § 1639 (2010) (setting federal standards for mortgages, including
disclosure requirements and limitations on, for example, balloon payments,
negative amortization, and the extension of credit without regard to the
consumer’s ability to pay); North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, N.C. GEN.
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Very small loans, or microcredit, and the experience of
developing nations in promoting and then regulating microcredit,
offer important lessons in the ways credit can either alleviate or
exacerbate poverty. In the developing world, microcredit has been
hailed as a key tool for alleviating poverty, and the microcredit
industry has grown dramatically in the past twenty years. The
successes and failures of widely varying models and legal regimes
for microcredit and microfinance can inform credit regulation and
oversight in both developed and developing nations. In Part II of
this Article, I consider the utilitarian and equity concerns that
should motivate credit policy, using a human development
framework. A defensible theory of welfare economics is an
essential foundation for any coherent utilitarian evaluation of
credit laws. In Parts III and IV, I review the recent microcredit
experiences of Bangladesh, South Africa, and Bolivia and the
evidence of effects on borrower welfare. In Part V, I survey the
debate in the United States concerning regulation of payday
loans and the incoherent legal response to dealing with payday
lending to date. Finally, I propose some principles for future
credit regulation and areas for further research, drawing on the
theoretical framework of human development welfare economics
and the empirical lessons learned from the United States’ and
developing nations’ experiences with small loans to the poor and
working class.
II. The Welfare Economics of Small-Loan Credit
Much of the disagreement between researchers who conclude
that microcredit and payday lending is either beneficial or
harmful is a result of asking different questions. Advocates of
regulation tend to focus on spiraling debt, the costs of debt
default, and high interest and fees (compared to other types of
loans), treating these as welfare harms, and they also cite more
STAT. 24-1.1E (2011) (placing restrictions and limitations on high-cost home
loans); see also LEAH A. PLUNKETT ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., SMALL
DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCTS SCORECARD—UPDATED (2010), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/Updated_Score
card.pdf (surveying state laws restricting payday loans and similar products and
documenting and scoring each state’s actions concerning small loan products);
infra text accompanying notes 151–78.
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direct welfare losses, such as psychological harm and social
exclusion resulting from excessive debt.12 Advocates of the free
market, on the other hand, measure access to credit as an end in
itself, and they invoke substitution effects, i.e., the argument that
restricting one form of credit will merely drive borrowers to other,
less beneficial forms.13 These regulation opponents often assume
that reduced credit access reduces welfare, although in some
cases they attempt to measure welfare losses directly, such as
unemployment or subjective assessment of financial well-being.14
A comprehensive approach to credit regulation requires a
comprehensive and sound theory of welfare maximization, or at
least of net welfare improvement, and therefore a careful account
of all the categories of welfare benefits and harms that credit and
debt produce.
A. The Inadequacy of Revealed Preferences
By conventional measures, microcredit in the developing
world has been a tremendous success.15 By the end of 2009,
microlenders reported having reached 190 million individuals,
68% of whom were among the poorest (the $1 per day World Bank
12. See Martin, supra note 6, at 570–78 (concentrating primarily on payday
lending’s high interest rates, high fees, and the so-called “debt trap,” the
situation that arises when a borrower must take out repeated loans because the
repayment of prior loans leaves them with inadequate funds); Parrish & King,
supra note 6, at 4 (finding that the “debt trap” causes borrowers, over the entire
industry, to pay $3.5 billion annually in extra fees); Stegman & Farris, supra
note 6, at 8–9 (noting that payday lenders “charge fees that, although moderate
in absolute terms, translate into extremely high and profitable compound
interest rates” and that “the incidence of repeat borrowing at additional fees by
individual borrowers has grown to epidemic proportions”).
13. Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household
Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap 3 (Federal Reserve
Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. 08-32, 2008), available at http://www.
philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2008/wp0832.pdf (finding that a significant reduction in the availability of payday loans in
Oregon resulted in former borrowers shifting to inferior substitutes).
14. See id. (stating that “employment status is a useful proxy for (financial)
well-being here because unemployment is likely to be involuntary” and noting
that “subjective assessments help address the issue that financial condition may
be difficult to infer from objective choices and outcomes”).
15. For a review of the literature on microcredit, see DE AGHION &
MORDUCH, supra note 5, at 12–17.
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extreme poverty threshold) and 82% of whom were women.16
Viewed in terms of “efficiency,” i.e., the number and volume of
voluntary transactions, it seems that microcredit has been a boon
to the welfare of lenders and borrowers in poor countries. This
has been the case not only in Bangladesh, where the Grameen
Bank pioneered microcredit as we know it, but all over south
Asia, Latin America, and even Africa.17 Similarly, in the United
States, the growth of payday lending and related categories of
small loans to lower-income workers has been called “explosive.”18
While microlending, narrowly defined, is a product separate and
distinct from payday lending, i.e., small, short-term consumer
loans to wage earners, in deregulated environments the two
products can easily become substitutes, and they exhibit
numerous similarities in their observed welfare harms and
benefits.19
If we rely on the revealed preference measure of consumer
welfare, then any credit expansion by definition improves
consumer welfare.20 Revealed preference theory posits that
consumers express preferences through market purchases,
including the purchase of a loan.21 If borrowing is a transaction
that reveals the borrower’s preferences, then any voluntary loan
or credit transaction could be thought to enhance welfare, if
welfare is utility and utility consists of revealed preferences.22
16. SAM DALEY-HARRIS, MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, STATE OF THE
MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN REPORT 2011 3, available at http://www.micro
creditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2011/SOCR_2011_EN_web.pdf.
17. Id. at 59–68 (listing all verified microfinance institutions by region and
providing data on number of clients, percentage of clients among the world’s
poorest, and percentage of female clients).
18. See Stegman & Faris, supra note 6, at 8.
19. See Muhammad Sayeedul Haque & Masahiro Yamao, Can Microcredit
Alleviate Rural Poverty? A Case Study of Bangladesh, 36 WORLD ACAD. SCI. ENG.
& TECH. 648, 655 (2009).
20. See e.g., Marc Anthony Fusaro & Richard E. Ericson, The Welfare
Economics of “Bounce Protection” Programs, 33 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 55, 55 (2010)
(arguing that bounce protection fees at an effective 1,900% interest rate enhance
consumer welfare based on revealed preference analysis).
21. Paul Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers’ Behaviour, 5
ECONOMICA 61, 61 (1938) (describing revealed preference theory of utility
measurement in the seminal article on the subject).
22. See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 322 (1977) (showing
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Thus, any regulation that constrains voluntary credit
transactions would reduce consumer welfare. On the other hand,
a more robust approach to welfare economics recognizes that
borrowers can suffer net harm from voluntary transactions, as
when borrowers’ income, consumption, and other measures of
well-being decline as a result of getting a loan. Moreover, from a
macroeconomic point of view, aggregate increases in consumer
borrowing, and corresponding declines in savings, jeopardize
future output growth and, hence, aggregate welfare.23
The notion that if you buy something, it must make you
better off, has obvious limitations as a utilitarian norm for
evaluating credit for the poor.24 Among the many flaws with
revealed preference theory, several undermine its usefulness
when considering credit regulation.
The first flaw is the problem of income distribution.
Preferences are revealed through purchasing, and income and
assets limit purchasing. Income is limited in any economy with
involuntary
unemployment
and
underemployment.
For
consumption goods, this means a market allocation through
revealed preferences will favor luxury goods, and a social welfare
function based on revealed preferences will inadequately supply
basic needs to the poor.
Credit is a peculiar type of market good, and because of its
peculiarity, the poor will tend to purchase it in excess. Credit is
not a consumption good; it is a device to trade present
consumption for future consumption. The welfare gain of
borrowing must be distinguished from welfare gains from
consumption that borrowing makes possible. The purchase made
with a loan will soon be offset by the later forgone purchases
prevented when the loan must be repaid.

that, in a simplified model, engaging in an action provides a revealed
preference, which must be chosen because it provides greater utility).
23. See Aldo Barba & Massimo Pivetti, Rising Household Debt: Its Causes
and Macroeconomic Implications—A Long-Period Analysis, 33 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 113, 118 (2009) (noting that “a characteristic feature of the long-run
analysis of household debt is that, being output as potential, consumer credit
impinges on production as it affects the amount of saving channelled into
investment”).
24. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 76–81 (1999).
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Consider the borrower with a $1,000 monthly income who
borrows $200 with a promise to repay $280 a month later. The
borrower’s consumption over two months will be $1,200 in month
one, but only $720 in month two, or $1,920. Without the loan the
borrower would have consumed $2,000 of goods and services. Is
the income-constrained borrower really expressing a preference
for that reduced consumption over two months, or is she simply
responding in the present to immediate needs? The question is
not whether the $200 expended produced a welfare gain in the
short run; it is whether advancing the use of the $200 by thirty
days produced a large enough benefit to offset the $80 cost in the
long run.
The “preference” of the poor for borrowing is driven by
chronic income shortfalls, a preference they would not reveal if
they had adequate income-earning opportunities.25 Thus the poor
can use credit in welfare-enhancing ways but also out of
desperate and immediate need for money with which to reveal
their basic preference to eat. This is particularly true when the
borrower considers the possibility of not repaying, and the
consequences of not repaying the borrowed money in the later
time period are uncertain (or irrationally discounted by the
borrower). In other words, the borrower may have incorrect
information or beliefs about the need to curtail future
consumption as the trade-off for current consumption that
borrowing makes possible.
The second flaw with revealed preference as a proxy for
welfare is that preferences are unstable and inconsistent.
Revealed preference theory assumes fixed and stable preferences,
which real people, rich and poor alike, do not exhibit.26 A
theoretical rational consumer will trade off future consumption
for present consumption (i.e., borrow) only based on a careful
calculation discounting future consumption at some reasonable
25. See Lois Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of
Class Position, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 593–94 (2009) (noting that “borrowers
who are driven by need, however, know that payday lenders are exploiting
them, that credit cards are a trap, and that rent-to-own stores are a rip-off, but
in the face of such dire need, the price of credit and the effects of indebtedness
become irrelevant”).
26. See Ramsay, supra note 6, at 371 (showing that individuals tend to
have time-inconsistent preferences and poorly calculate the probabilities of
uncertain future events).
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discount rate. A human being will discount the future to
something close to zero, especially when hungry children are in
the house. The same borrower will experience severe distress
when the consequences of the borrowing decision are met and
there is no money for food after the loan comes due.27 To say that
such a borrower has revealed her preferences over both time
periods is a shallow measure of utility indeed. It is only because
the consumer in the present has the decision power that she
usurps the preferences of herself as consumer in the future. In
fact, if asked, the consumer might express a preference for selfrestraint devices (like low credit-card limits) because she is aware
of time-inconsistent preferences and self-control problems.28
Moreover, the overconfidence bias leads borrowers to assume a
much greater disposable income to repay loans in the future than
is likely to be available.29 This overconfidence combines with the
rationalizing function, by which the borrower mitigates the
mental stress of knowing she is borrowing money she cannot
repay, to justify borrowing decisions that do not maximize
welfare in the long term.30 Amartya Sen and Jon Elster have also
pointed out that preferences adapt to the circumstances of the
27. See Brian Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the
Payday Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 550 (2011) (finding that increased
access to payday borrowing leads to difficulties in paying for essential goods and
services including rent, utilities, and medical care).
28. See Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How SelfLimitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 693, 736 (2003) (arguing that a rational individual may place selfimposed limitations on their available choices to prevent the temptation to
select an option that would be harmful in the long term); Angela Littwin,
Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income
Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 479–88 (2008) (discussing several policy
measures that would increase consumers’ ability to impose limits on their
temptation to abuse credit cards, including allowing consumers to opt out of
credit card offers and granting consumers the ability to cap their credit limit).
29. See Lauren Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 197, 235 (2008) (explaining that, due to inaccurate predictions of future
employment and income, borrowers will often secure unaffordable loans); Cass
Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 251 (2006)
(arguing that excessively optimistic borrowers will tend to make welfarereducing choices because they do not sufficiently consider problems associated
with borrowing).
30. See Willis, supra note 29, at 235 (noting that “consumers can avoid fear
and anxiety when contemplating objectively unpleasant facts of life by
perceiving personal risk overoptimistically”).
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consumer, so that for example, poor people learn to be satisfied
with conditions that seem objectively intolerable and leave them
far short of truly satisfying basic human needs for shelter,
security, health, and education.31
A third and related flaw with revealed preferences as a tool
to measure the welfare effects of consumer credit is that
preferences can be manipulated. Consumer behavioral biases and
abbreviated reasoning are well understood and exploited by
sellers of credit.32 Lenders shape borrower preferences.33 Thus,
consumers can be and are persuaded to enter credit transactions
that reduce their consumption in the present and future, do not
result in investment or other gains, and simply transfer their
limited resources to lenders and investors.34 Preferences that
have been manipulated and exploited by lenders cannot
reasonably be equated with a borrower’s welfare or utility.
Income inequality, instability and adaptability of preferences,
and lender exploitation lead poor borrowers into crises of
overindebtedness, or at least into chronic distress of carrying
interest payment burdens that further diminish their already
31. See generally JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF
RATIONALITY (1983); AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES AND DEVELOPMENT
(1984).
32. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 46 (2008) (explaining that because borrowers were overly optimistic
concerning the probability of future borrowing, they focused on the annual fee,
which would be paid regardless of borrowing, instead of the interest rate, and,
as a result, lenders lower the annual fee and increase the interest rate); Jason
Kilborn, Behavioral Economics, Overindebtedness and Comparative Consumer
Bankruptcy: Searching for Causes and Evaluating Solutions, 22 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 13, 16 (2005) (noting that, after the “liberalization” of consumer credit
regulations in the 1980s, the resulting competition pressured lenders to market
and structure their products to exploit their customers’ psychological biases);
Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 150 (2009) (finding
that, armed with the knowledge of consumers’ biases, “marketers engage in
various strategies to increase sales by exploiting consumer search costs,
obfuscation, identity group marketing, focusing on salient features, identifying
with consumers’ subjective goals, and other strategies”).
33. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38
AKRON L. REV. 725, 730 (2005) (arguing that lenders manipulate the borrower’s
reference points, framing the possible outcomes, which influences the borrower’s
choices).
34. See Lauren Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 785–87 (2006)
(discussing the effects of lender framing on consumer choices).
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inadequate purchasing power. These readily observable
consequences raise concerns, not only about consumer welfare,
but also about the distributional effects of credit regulation or
nonregulation35 and the external costs of overindebtedness.36 The
dilemma for credit regulation, therefore, is to take account of the
fact that voluntary credit transactions can be harmful to
borrowers and to the broader society, while still acknowledging
the various ways in which credit and debt can enhance consumer
welfare in both the short and long term.
Empirical studies that attempt to measure the welfare effects
of microcredit on the poor have reached mixed conclusions. In
several countries, like South Africa and Bolivia, liberalized
microlending has led to serious overindebtedness and further
impoverished the people it was intended to help.37 Even in
Bangladesh, the success story of Grameen Bank has been clouded
by evidence of extremely aggressive debt collection and even
domestic violence resulting from the lending program, and the
ability of microloans to raise individuals from poverty on a lasting
basis is still controversial.38 On the other hand, some studies
have asked the right question and found that microlending has
resulted in improvements in borrowers’ income, consumption
stability, and other measures of well-being.39
35. See Edward C. Glaeser & José Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower nor a
Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41
J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1998) (arguing that usury laws restricting interest rates help
redistribute income from rich to poor); Iain Ramsay, Consumer Credit Law,
Distributive Justice and the Welfare State, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 177, 178
(1995) (arguing that “the primary questions in relation to consumer credit
regulation are distributional, and are linked to the achievement of values such
as security, autonomy, and equality of access to credit markets”).
36. See Javier Bianchi, Credit Externalities: Macroeconomic Effects and
Policy Implications, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 398, 398 (2010) (finding that excessive
borrowing can substantially increase the number and severity of financial
crises).
37. See infra notes 118–66 and accompanying text.
38. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Why the West
Has Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L.
217, 293–94 (2005); see also Haque & Yamao, supra note 19, at 655 (cataloging
the failures of the microcredit institutions to adequately alleviate rural poverty).
39. See Richard Rosenberg, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Does
Microcredit
Really
Help
Poor
People?
(2010),
available
at
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.41443/fn59.pdf (finding that, while
microcredit may not alleviate poverty, it prevents threats to the poor’s minimum

1106

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093 (2012)

B. Rethinking the Consumer Welfare Benefits and Harms of
Credit
These observations raise an essential first question: by what
measure (other than revealed preferences) are we to evaluate the
benefits and harms of credit extended to the poor? Credit might
improve consumer welfare in several ways.40 Enterprise loans
that permit borrowers to invest in income-producing assets or
activities and then to earn a return that exceeds the cost of the
credit offer the easiest example.41 An important and related
second benefit of small loans is to preserve employment. A lowwage worker might borrow a small sum to repair a car, buy a
uniform, or deal with a short-term emergency to preserve her
ability to go to work.42
When money is borrowed for consumption rather than
entrepreneurship, permanent welfare is increased if the money is
used to purchase a durable good, like a car or washing machine,
that provides the consumer with a present-value savings
compared to the alternative, such as periodic payments for mass
transit or taxis or using a laundromat.43 A second consumerwelfare improvement results when a loan helps the consumer
avoid a cost, such as a penalty for failing to meet an existing
financial obligation.44 Third, some consumer and small business
borrowing is used simply to repay other debt that is maturing or
bears a higher interest rate, resulting in cash-flow savings.
Finally, a consumer might simply borrow against future income
to smooth consumption, i.e., to provide dinner for the week before
consumption level).
40. See Feibelman, supra note 3, at 75–78 (discussing a number of ways
that consumer credit can promote growth and development).
41. See DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 5, at 25–26 (reporting on the
effect of introducing microcredit into a new market). But see Haque & Yamao,
supra note 19, at 655 (finding that loans from microfinance institutions in
Bangladesh were largely used for purposes other than those stated, including
buying food and paying off prior loans).
42. See Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using
Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUDS.
433, 453 (2009).
43. See Edward C. Lawrence & Gregory Elliehausen, A Comparative
Analysis of Payday Loan Customers, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 299, 302 (2008).
44. Id.
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payday.45 The smoothing of consumption does not reduce poverty
in the long run, but the other uses of credit could do so by
increasing income or reducing expenses. Consumption smoothing
does provide a welfare benefit, albeit more difficult to quantify
and weigh against the interest cost.46 A simple example is the
household that borrows to continue purchasing essential
medicines or a healthy diet for a diabetic and thus avoids costly
medical emergencies.47 More challenging is the tradeoff between
simply being hungry for a few days and reducing the weekly food
budget by the cost of loan interest.
Whether any of these welfare improvements actually occur
should be considered an empirically testable hypothesis, rather
than an assumption accepted on faith. Each category of possible
benefits could be the subject of empirical measurement for a
particular credit product in a particular market.
Consumer credit also causes obvious and not-so-obvious
harms to consumers. First, of course, are the interest and fees,
i.e., the cost of the credit itself. To be sure, the cost of credit in the
welfare-enhancing examples discussed above may be less than
the consumer’s welfare benefit. In other words, the idealized
rational consumer will only borrow money at interest if the
consumer’s benefit from the loan exceeds the interest and other
costs. Nevertheless, any fair welfare analysis of a credit product
must weigh the cost of credit against its benefits. The higher the
costs, the less likely there will be a positive net benefit, an
obvious proposition but one that underlies the intuitive rationale
for usury ceilings. Microcredit interest rates range from 20% to
30% per annum but can sometimes be much higher.48 Payday
45. See Barba & Pivetti, supra note 23, at 119; Melzer, supra note 27, at
518.
46. For one attempt to model the welfare benefits of credit access to smooth
consumption, see Kartik B. Athreya, Credit Access, Labor Supply, and
Consumer Welfare, 94 ECON. Q. 17 (2008).
47. The ability to borrow in order to resolve emergencies has been
identified by poor borrowers themselves as a key welfare benefit of credit access
and one justifying the use of high-cost loans on a short-term basis. See Littwin,
supra note 28 (reporting the results of in-depth interviews with low-income
women).
48. Richard Rosenberg et. al., Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, The
New Moneylenders: Are the Poor Being Exploited by High Microcredit Interest
Rates? 5 (2009), available at http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.9534/.
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loan rates in the United States are typically between 200% and
500% per annum.49
In the real world, consumers often miscalculate, or, for
various other reasons, borrow in a situation that does not
increase their welfare.50 Lenders are motivated to obfuscate the
total cost of credit through complex pricing so that borrowers
underestimate borrowing costs.51 For the poor especially, credit
can simply aggravate a bad cash-flow situation, adding interest
costs to an existing monthly shortfall.52 This can result in
consumers being worse off than had they not borrowed.
The second major category of credit harms encompasses
those that flow from debt distress and default. Overindebted
consumers can be pushed into default and bankruptcy by
repeated borrowing, even in small amounts,53 and suffer
additional costs, such as the health effects of debt-related stress,54
49. Will Dobie & Paige Marta Skiba, Information Asymmetries in
Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Two Payday Lending Firms 6
(Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-05, 2011) (noting that a
typical two week payday loan carries a 15% to 18% finance charge).
50. This can be due to various behavioral factors. Consumers may suffer
from self-control problems and “choose” short-term welfare gains even when
they understand the long-term costs far outweigh the gains. See Susan BlockLieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality,
Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1481, 1543–44 (2006) (stating that “the impulse for immediate gratification is
often irresistible, notwithstanding the long-term consequences of such action”).
Borrowers also may systematically underestimate the cost of borrowing or be
overconfident about how rapidly they will repay. Id. at 1540–41 (noting that,
due to overconfidence bias, “borrowers are more likely to underestimate than
overestimate the risks associated with uncertainty”).
51. See Willis, supra note 34, at 727–28 (arguing that in the subprime
mortgage market, pricing is complicated and nontransparent, creating an
information asymmetry that lenders exploit).
52. See Stegman & Faris, supra note 6, at 19.
53. See Melzer, supra note 27 (finding that payday loan access increases
delinquencies on other debts and postponement of health care); Paige Marta
Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy 1 (Oct. 20,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that access to payday loans increases
bankruptcy rates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See Karlan & Zinman, supra note 42, at 461 (finding stress-related
mental health effects from overindebtedness); Jeannine Aversa, AP Impact:
Debt Hurts Your Body, Too, USA TODAY, June 9, 2008 (finding that “[w]hen
people are dealing with mountains of debt, they’re much more likely to report
health problems”).
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and other social and external costs.55 Overindebtedness reduces
welfare not only when borrowers default on their payments, but
also when they resort to reducing consumption, selling assets, or
borrowing repeatedly to avoid payment default.56 Debt default
results not only in direct economic costs from impaired credit
scores, repossession of collateral, and added collection fees, but
also in a myriad of health impairments and other negative effects
on the borrower’s well-being.57
The U.S. military recently concluded that high-cost credit
was particularly detrimental to the welfare of enlisted soldiers,58
and one experimental study found that payday borrowing
measurably reduced job performance among Air Force
personnel.59 In contrast, a study done in cooperation with a South
African microlender found positive consumer welfare effects of
expanding access to consumer credit, even at rates in excess of
100% annual percentage rate (APR).60 The study measured
income, consumption, physical and mental health, and credit
scores several months after the four-month loans were due to be
55. See Catarina Frade & Claudia Abreu Lopes, Overindebtedness and
Financial Stress: A Comparative Study in Europe, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT
AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 249, 249
(William Whitford, Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, & Iain Ramsay eds., 2009)
(noting that “overindebtedness . . . may potentially lead to social, financial, and
market exclusion” and “[i]n extreme cases, divorce, mental disorders,
homelessness or even suicide”); Therese Wilson, Responsible Lending or
Restrictive Lending Practices? Balancing Concerns Regarding Over-Indebtedness
with Addressing Financial Exclusion, in THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER CREDIT
REGULATION 91, 95 (Michelle Kelly-Louw, James P. Nehf & Peter Rott eds.,
2008) (stating that “consumers who find themselves over-indebted may suffer
stress, depression, anxiety; become violent, suicidal, or homicidal; and face
barriers to access to further credit and barriers to work”).
56. Adrian González & Claudio González-Vega, Overindebtedness in the
Bolivian Microfinance Sector, 1997–2001 (Sobreendeudamiento en Las
Microfinanzas Bolivianas, 1997–2001) (Sept. 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1413005.
57. See Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 981
(2012) (cataloging a wide variety of harms caused by debt distress).
58. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS (2006),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report_to_congress_final.pdf
(describing loss of security clearances, divorces, repossessions, disciplinary
action, and discharges resulting from overindebtedness).
59. See Carrell & Zinman, supra note 6, at 3.
60. Karlan & Zinman, supra note 42, at 461.
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repaid and compared the outcomes with a control group who were
denied credit but had similar credit characteristics.61 Some
increase in stress was found among the experimental group of
borrowers with increased credit access.62
A defensible social welfare function for credit regulation
needs to compare utility and disutility consequences of borrowing
for individuals, or at least to take seriously the existence of
positive and negative welfare effects and the fact that revealed
preferences provide an impoverished means to measure those
effects.
C. The Human Development Approach to Welfare Economics
How should the welfare impact of lending to the poor be
evaluated, and what goals should credit regulation pursue?
Recognizing the inadequacy of gross domestic product (GDP) as a
measure of human welfare, the human development movement
has proposed a more sophisticated set of measures for the
aggregate welfare of societies. These ideas have been embodied in
the United Nations’ annual Human Development Report and
Human Development Index (HDI),63 as well as the work of
Amartya Sen64 and Martha Nussbaum.65 Rather than using
average GDP as a measure of a nation’s well-being, the HDI
combines measures of health, education, and income, but with an
emphasis on the income of people below the median.66 The intent
of such welfare measures is twofold: the HDI addresses
distribution of wealth and income, recognizing that there is a
diminishing marginal utility to income for an individual, and
income improvement means more to the poor than to the rich. In
other words, for a fixed level of income and assets, aggregate
61. Id. at 449–55 (explaining the results of the study).
62. Id. at 461.
63. See MUHBAB AL HAQ, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 46–66
(1995).
64. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 24; AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND
MEASUREMENT (1982).
65. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 44 (2010).
66. See AL HAQ, supra note 63, at 49–50.
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utility will be greater if the poor have a larger (or less unequal)
share of income and assets. The HDI also, and just as
importantly, treats income as a means to the end of enhancing
the capabilities, choices, and opportunities open to all people, and
not as an end in itself, by measuring outcomes like health and
literacy.67 To improve aggregate welfare measured in this way,
policies need to improve the health, education, and other
capabilities of the population, as well as the incomes and
consumption levels of the poor preferentially. In other words,
income and GDP are not direct measures of human welfare.
Instead, welfare can and should be measured by looking at
consumption of basic needs (food and shelter), health, education,
and the freedom to participate in civil society, and at the
distribution of those benefits across society.
Credit markets seem to be an excellent place to apply the
human development framework. Martha Nussbaum describes
access to credit as a “fertile capability,” using the example of an
Indian woman who was enabled “to protect her bodily integrity
(not returning to her abusive husband), to have employment
options, to participate in politics, to have a sense of emotional
well-being, to form valuable affiliations, and to enjoy enhanced
self-respect.”68 She rightly focuses not simply on the wealth and
consumption effects of credit, but on those monetary measures as
means to the real ends, including the capacity of all people to live
healthy, safe lives and to develop their intellectual, emotional,
political, and associative capabilities.69 On the other hand, if we
recognize that in the case of consumer credit, more is not
necessarily better, then a legal regime for creation and
67. See id.; AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 8 n.8 (2002)
(distinguishing between the HDI and previous measures which did not focus on
“human development” indicators); see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 65, at 59
(noting that the HDI “heavily weight[s] items (longevity, education) not typically
emphasized in development rankings”). See generally Kerry Rittich, The Future
of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of
the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199 (2004) (describing the move among
international development institutions toward human development and social
outcome measures rather than measures of economic growth for its own sake).
68. NUSSBAUM, supra note 65, at 44.
69. Id. at 33–34 (introducing the “central capabilities” that a political order
should secure to its citizens, including bodily health, emotional well-being, and
free association).
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cancellation of consumer debt need not and should not be based
on the premise that regulation should aim to maximize the
volume of consumer lending to the poor. Instead, a partly
utilitarian, partly egalitarian approach to credit regulation based
on a human development framework would seek to stimulate the
availability of welfare-enhancing credit forms, while minimizing
the volume of harmful and damaging forms of credit, if those
forms can be described and distinguished. Credit improves
welfare if the borrower’s earning capacity, housing, health,
education, and/or consumption levels are permanently improved
as a result of borrowing. Even the stabilizing effect of
consumption smoothing can and should be recognized as a
welfare benefit, but consumption smoothing is obviously more
problematic to measure and compare to the cost of borrowing.
The higher the interest rate prevailing, of course, the less
likely that poor borrowers are achieving net welfare benefits, but
this will also depend on the amount of credit, its duration, and
the use to which it is put. To summarize, a human development
approach to distinguishing beneficial credit from harmful credit
requires several elements. First, we need a reasonable estimate of
improvements in income, consumption levels, health, education,
and other indicators of well-being made possible by borrowing;
second, and more challenging, we need a means to quantify the
welfare benefits of consumption smoothing over time when there
is no permanent increase in income or other measures of welfare;
and, third, we need a comparison of those welfare benefits to the
interest and other costs of the loan, as well as the risk-adjusted
harms that result from debt distress and default for those who
cannot repay their loans.
Studies of microlending in the developing world have in fact
attempted to measure not only the raw volume of lending but also
its contribution to long-term reduction of poverty (i.e.,
improvement of the assets and consumption patterns of the poor),
and the conclusions are decidedly mixed.70 Studies of small-loan
lending in the United States have considered welfare impacts on
individual borrowers but not on the poor preferentially. Credit
that improves the income of the poor or permits long-term cost

39.

70.

See, e.g.,

DE

AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 5; Rosenberg, supra note
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savings ought to be favored, while credit that exploits self-control
problems and does not enhance welfare but simply transfers
income from the poor to lenders and investors ought to be
disfavored. The results of recently expanded credit access for the
poor in different nations around the world may be instructive in
this endeavor.
III. Lending to the Poor in the Developing World—The Grameen
Bank Entrepreneurial Model
The paradigmatic success story for microcredit as a means to
improve the welfare of the poor has been the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh. Muhammad Yunus, winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace
Prize, founded Grameen Bank in 1976.71 Dr. Yunus hit on the
idea of microloans when he and his students interviewed poor
women in a village near his university.72 They told him that
moneylenders lent them money at high rates, then sold them
bamboo to make stools, and at the end of the day purchased the
finished stools for resale, leaving the women with a tiny profit.73
If only they had the money to buy their own bamboo each day, the
women could make a much better living.74 Dr. Yunus was
surprised at the miniscule amounts they were borrowing and
repaying each day, and he decided to make them a loan from his
own pocket.75
Under the guidance of Dr. Yunus, the Grameen Bank
developed a unique lending method that found innovative
solutions for some of the information and moral hazard issues
that previously had prevented lending to the rural poor.76
Grameen Bank’s basic loan does not require any collateral, and
although loans are made to groups of five borrowers (nearly all
71. MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICROLENDING AND THE
BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY 45 (1999).
72. Id. at 47–55.
73. Id. at 49–50 (recounting the story of a particular interview and the
subsequent formation of the idea of microlending).
74. Id. at 51.
75. Id. at 54.
76. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets, 4 WORLD
BANK ECON. REV. 351, 353 (1990) (calling the Grameen Bank “a model of
success”).
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women), only the individual borrower is responsible for
repayment.77 However, if a loan is not repaid on time, no new
loans are made to any group members.78 Because payments are
collected in public, personal honor and humiliation play an
important role in addition to the economic incentive of access to
future credit.79 Repayment rates are reportedly 90%.80
No written contracts are used, nor is the legal system used in
any way to enforce loan repayment.81 The interest rate is 10%
add-on, equivalent to about 20% APR.82 Although the original
intent was to fund small enterprises, Grameen Bank loans are
used for education, consumption, housing, and other purposes not
related to income-generating activities.83
For the early years of its growth, Grameen Bank relied on
grants and below-market-rate loans to fund its expensive
operations.84 It now claims to be funded entirely from deposits of
its members and not to have relied on grants or outside loans
since 1998.85 The frequent and personal contact between
Grameen staff and its borrowers, together with the small loan
77. YUNUS, supra note 71, at 67.
78. Id.
79. Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Human Worth as Collateral, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 793,
822 (2007).
80. Grameen Bank, Grameen Bank Monthly Update in US$: November,
2011, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&
id=453&Itemid=527 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
81. Grameen Bank, Grameen Bank at a Glance, http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=0
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. See Jonathan Morduch, The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence
from the Grameen Bank, 60 J. DEV. ECON. 229, 243 (1999).
83. See DARYL COLLINS, ET AL., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR: HOW THE WORLD’S
POOR LIVE ON $2 A DAY 164 (2009) (noting that, despite Grameen Bank’s intent
that the money be spent on “productive investment,” microloans can be
successfully used for consumption smoothing); Haque & Yamao, supra note 19,
at 649–50 (finding that 33% of borrowers used microloans for consumption
purposes).
84. See Morduch, supra note 82, at 236.
85. Grameen Bank at a Glance, supra note 81. Grameen Bank audited
financial statements are available at http://www.grameen-info.org. Grameen
provides life insurance to its borrowers at no additional charge; it has recently
started to earn some income from ancillary businesses, for example a cell phone
service that employs village dwellers as “telephone ladies.” Id.
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sizes, make reaching break-even status, while charging relatively
low interest rates, a continuing challenge.86
Apart from the group lending model, Grameen’s loan
program uses a variety of other features to ensure successful
repayment:
• Progressive increases in loan size: initial loans are
small, and borrowers (and fellow group members) who
successfully repay their loans become eligible for
larger loans.87
•

Intensive staffing: Grameen operates through a vast
network of branches, and the loan officers in the
branches visit their clients at least once weekly.88
During these visits, new loans are disbursed and
payments are collected, all in public view.89 Although
one study found that repayment rates did not drop
measurably when borrowers paid less frequently than
weekly,90 it still seems intuitively clear that the
constant staff–borrower contact is one likely factor in
Grameen’s success. It also, however, imposes salary
costs that limit the potential for profitability and
growth.

•

The Sixteen Decisions: Grameen Bank requires that
each of its borrowers memorize and recite sixteen
behavioral commitments intended to encourage her
personal development and progress out of poverty.91
The Decisions (so-called because they were developed
from a bottom-up borrower consultation process)
include such behaviors as not having too many
children, growing vegetables, and repairing and
upgrading houses. Although loans are not conditioned

86. See Morduch, supra note 82, at 230 (explaining the difficulties in
pursuing Grameen Bank’s mission despite high per-transaction costs).
87. See Grameen Bank at a Glance, supra note 81.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Erica Field & Rohini Pande, Repayment Frequency and Default in
Microfinance, Evidence from India, 6 J. EURO. ECON. ASS’N 501, 508 (2008).
91. YUNUS, supra note 71, at 135–37; Dyal-Chand, supra note 38, at 227,
nn.46, 47.
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on compliance, the bank does monitor success of its
branches in achieving these goals and thus links loan
repayment with progress out of poverty in the minds
of its customers.92 There is some research supporting
the effectiveness of the Sixteen Decisions. Women who
take Grameen microloans reduce their fertility and
increase their participation in politics and civil
society.93
•

Loans are always amortizing. Every weekly payment
must cover the interest due and reduce the principal
balance.94 This contrasts with the typical payday loan
product in the United States, which permits
borrowers to pay interest only without reducing their
debt.95

•

Payment defaults are always worked out if possible.
Loan officers who are faced with a missed payment
immediately inquire into the circumstances and
arrange revised payment schedules if at all possible.96

•

Groups lose access to credit when payments from any
member are not made on time.97

•

Insurance schemes: through a combination of linked
savings accounts, life insurance, emergency loans, and
other tools, Grameen strives to minimize loan defaults

92. See DAVID BORNSTEIN, THE PRICE OF A DREAM: THE STORY OF THE
GRAMEEN BANK 95 (2005) (describing the Sixteen Decisions as “the bank’s social
development manifesto”); YUNUS, supra note 71, at 137, 202 (describing the
development of the Sixteen Decisions as a way to encourage social
improvement).
93. See Md. Abul Basher, Empowerment of Microcredit Participants and Its
Spillover Effects: Evidence from the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, 40 J.
DEVELOPING AREAS 173, 173–83 (2007) [hereinafter Basher, Empowerment],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983363 (arguing that “the Grameen Bank
transforms its participants from a passive recipient of credit to a well responsive
and active agent in economic and non-economic aspects of life”).
94. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 92, at 44–50.
95. Martin, supra note 6, at 564.
96. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 92, at 170–73 (describing Grameen’s loan
adjustment practices); YUNUS, supra note 71, at 68–71 (noting Grameen’s high
repayment rates).
97. BORNSTEIN, supra note 92, at 20, 45.
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caused by predictable crises in the lives of its poor
borrowers.98
Bangladesh experiences frequent floods and other disasters.
As a result, Grameen borrowers have frequently lost their homes
and their businesses and have not been able to repay their
loans.99 Grameen responds by mobilizing additional capital and
extending emergency loans while not canceling any of the prior
debt.100 From these experiences Grameen has learned that
insurance schemes are essential to protect its borrowers and their
loans against foreseeable risks faced by the poor in a country like
Bangladesh.101
The Grameen program is known for its focus on women.
Grameen Bank loans initially were made equally to men and
women, but the bank eventually concluded that women were
better “fighters against poverty” and more likely to use money to
improve their family’s situation rather than for unproductive
purposes.102 On the other hand, Aminur Rahman reports that
women often were coerced into borrowing by husbands or male
relatives and may have faced greater violence, or at least been
disempowered, by becoming Grameen Bank borrowers.103
Grameen claims that 98% of its borrowers repay their loans,
but the real nonpayment rate is probably closer to 10% or
higher.104 Grameen Bank’s calculation compares the loans not
repaid after one year (recall that they are due in six months or
less) to the volume of loans outstanding.105 The denominator in
this fraction is not comparable to the numerator because of the
Bank’s rapid growth in loan volume, i.e., loans made in the
current year always exceed loans made two years earlier,
whereas it would be more meaningful to compare loans now in
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

YUNUS, supra note 71, at 137–40.
Id. at 138–40.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71–72; Dyal-Chand, supra note 38, at 228 n.51, 261–62.
See AMINUR RAHMAN, WOMEN AND MICROCREDIT IN RURAL BANGLADESH:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE RHETORIC AND REALITIES OF GRAMEEN BANK
LENDING 120–26 (1999) (analyzing rates of violence against women in
connection with their participation as Grameen borrowers).
104. Morduch, supra note 82, at 231–35.
105. Id.
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default to all loans originated at the same time, i.e., a year ago.106
Moreover, the borrowers reported as repaying their loans include
many who are late in paying but have arranged some alternative
schedule or emergency loan with Grameen to prevent complete
default.107 Nevertheless, the percentage of borrowers who repay
loans without difficulty is in the vicinity of 90%.108 On the other
hand, one survey of Bangladeshi microfinance borrowers from
multiple lenders, including Grameen Bank, found that only 51%
of poor borrowers made weekly payments on time and found
significant incidence of borrowers selling property or going to
moneylenders to make microfinance payments.109
There is considerable controversy about the effectiveness of
Grameen Bank, both on its own terms and in comparison to other
antipoverty strategies,110 and it is not my purpose to engage that
debate. Several studies have shown that Grameen borrowers do
succeed in developing microenterprises, raising their families’
incomes out of extreme poverty and becoming empowered in
numerous other ways.111 These studies, as well as their critics,
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Haque & Yamao, supra note 19, at 12–13, 16.
110. See id. at 17–18 (indicating that the majority of surveyed members of
microfinance institutions felt that their involvement had not had a positive
impact on their lives); Basher, Empowerment, supra note 93, at 180–82
(concluding that participation empowers members to take a more active role in
society and results in positive societal changes); Dyal-Chand, supra note 38, at
221 (arguing that the “key features of the [Grameen Bank] model fail to
eliminate the informational and other problems that contribute to market
failure in poor communities, arguably leaving the poor with even fewer
resources to sell their products or services”); M. Kabir Hassan, The Microfinance
Revolution and the Grameen Bank Experience in Bangladesh, 11 FIN. MARKETS,
INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 205, 258 (2002) (noting that “[t]he jury is still out
regarding the overall viability of microfinance organizations”); Rafiqul Bhuyan
Rafiq, Shahnaz Abdullah & Hamid Ahmadi, Women Empowerment and Credit
Control: An Empirical Analysis on Credit Recipients of Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh, 5 ICFAI J. FIN. ECON. 21 (2007); Mark Schreiner, A CostEffectiveness Analysis of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, 21 DEV. POL’Y REV.
357, 369–73 (2003) (finding that the Grameen Bank was cost-effective and that
it had positive impacts on various aspects of its members’ lives).
111. See SHAHIDUR R. KHANDKER, FIGHTING POVERTY WITH MICROCREDIT:
EXPERIENCE IN BANGLADESH 51–54 (1998) (finding increases in income,
household production, and employment associated with involvement with
Grameen); Basher, Empowerment, supra note 93, at 173–75, 180–82 (“Grameen
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are asking the right questions: what is the effect of loans on the
borrowers’ consumption, health, and other indicators of wellbeing?
Critics of the microcredit movement, such as Thomas
Dichter, dispute the welfare improvement claims made for
Grameen Bank.112 They argue that microcredit does little but
replace existing informal credit arrangements to fund subsistence
activity, activity with little or no prospect of growth. The overall
impact of Grameen on the poverty rate in Bangladesh remains
disappointingly marginal.113 Entrepreneurs face inherent limits
in markets and in the capacity of their country to create growth.
Microloans mostly just smooth consumption and may have a
limited role in unleashing productive capacity.114 Dichter also
argues that, as more microcredit lenders have entered the field,
the quality of the lending has deteriorated, a phenomenon he
calls self-pollution.115 The cases of Bolivia and South Africa,
discussed below, certainly support this view.
Professor Rashmi Dyal-Chand has argued that Grameen
Bank’s microlending model imposes Western and male-oriented
values on Third World women and imposes a one-size-fits-all
Bank also helps its participants to graduate from a passive recipient of credit to
an active agent of economic and social process.”).
112. See Thomas Dichter, Hype and Hope: The Worrisome State of the
Microcredit Movement, CGAP Microfinance Gateway (Mar. 24, 2006),
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.26.9051/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2012) (“[T]he hoped for poverty reduction impact of microcredit remains
elusive.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. See Md. Abul Basher, Towards Understanding the Mismatch Between
Micro and Macro Level Effects of Microcredit: Causes and Imperatives, 27
BANGL. DEV. STUD. 137, 144 (2001) (finding a “very meager rate of annual
poverty reduction”); Sarah Gibb, Microfinance’s Impact on Education, Poverty,
and Empowerment: A Case Study from the Bolivian Altiplano 20–23 (Institute
for Advanced Development Studies, Working Paper No. 04/2008), available at
http://www.inesad.edu.bo/pdf/wp04_2008.pdf (finding that microloans mostly
supported marginal informal economy activity and did little to improve
education or women’s empowerment).
114. See Dichter, supra note 112 (noting that while microcredit often helps
the poor “smooth consumption over periods of cyclical or unexpected
crises . . . this is not what the majority of microcredit enthusiasts claim it can
do—function as capital aimed at increasing the returns to a business activity”).
115. See id. (“As more and more operators have got involved, the quality of
microcredit operations has deteriorated just as the serious veteran players have
reached the point of perfecting their lending techniques. Microcredit is on the
verge of becoming a self-polluting industry.”).
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development model on widely varying cultural groups.116 The
overreliance on the idea of universal values embedded in
microlending, she argues, will lead to repeated failures when
microcredit is used as a development strategy in different
contexts, including the United States and the developed
countries.117 While Professor Dyal-Chand is quite right to caution
us about making cross-cultural generalizations regarding
microcredit, certain features of successful and unsuccessful
microlending programs can be readily identified and compared
and can be instructive in thinking about credit regulation
generally.
Scholars on both sides of the debate would probably concede
that some forms of microlending do improve the welfare of
borrowers but that empirical study is critical to evaluating the
real welfare costs and benefits of any microlending program. At
this point, the evidence of net welfare improvements is mixed at
best. Some advocates of microcredit have conceded that it does
not consistently produce permanent income improvements and
poverty reduction and have asserted instead the more
problematic consumption-smoothing benefits.118
Clearly, the loan product offered by Grameen Bank differs in
almost every respect from the payday loan product offered in the
United States. In fact, their only common feature is that the
loans are small. Before considering how legal regimes might
incorporate the lessons of microlending by Grameen Bank, it is
instructive to consider the failures of microcredit in other
developing nations.

116. See Dyal-Chand, supra note 38, at 289–94 (“The Bank does not simply
adopt the Bangladeshi male perspective. It compounds the problem by
superimposing on and through the model a more Western perspective about
women’s rights, needs, and liberation.”).
117. Id. at 303–06.
118. See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 2–6 (“Whether or not financial
services lift people out of poverty, they are vital tools in helping them to cope
with poverty.”).
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IV. Failures of Microcredit: The Bolivian and South African
Experiences
A. Bolivia
Bolivia is a relatively poor country, particularly compared to
its South American neighbors.119 After an economic crisis in the
early 1980s featuring 24,000% inflation,120 a new government
turned to market liberalization and microcredit as a strategy for
both poverty alleviation and economic growth.121 The microcredit
boom in Bolivia eventually fell victim to its own success. Between
1998 and 2004 Bolivia was plunged into another serious economic
and political crisis, exacerbated by widespread distress and
default brought on by its consumer lending sector.122 National
associations of debtors were formed, holding demonstrations and
demanding that the government intervene and cancel small-loan
debts.123 The Bolivian experience offers an instructive
counterpoint to the successes of microcredit in Bangladesh and
elsewhere.
Bolivia had suffered a serious crisis of hyperinflation in 1985,
leading to a complete loss of confidence in the traditional banking
sector.124 At the same time, thousands of workers lost jobs in
mining and in government service as a result of restructuring
promoted by the International Monetary Fund.125 The centerright government promoted microcredit, and it expanded
rapidly.126 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Prodem
119. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2007/2008, at 231 tbl.1 (ranking Bolivia 117th in the world on the 2005 U.N.
Human Development Index). In 2005, Bolivia had a per capita GDP of $2,819.
Id.
120. ELISABETH RHYNE, MAINSTREAMING MICROFINANCE: HOW LENDING TO
THE POOR BEGAN, GREW, AND CAME OF AGE IN BOLIVIA 36–37 (2001); Jason
Mitchell, Bolivia—Shaken But Still Standing, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 2004.
121. RHYNE, supra note 120, at 38–42.
122. Id. at 144–51; Reynaldo Marconi & Paul Mosley, Bolivia During the
Global Crisis 1998–2004: Towards a ‘Macroeconomics of Microfinance,’ 18 J.
INT’L DEV. 237, 238–39 (2006).
123. RHYNE, supra note 120, at 144–47; Marconi & Mosley, supra note 122,
at 246 n.12.
124. RHYNE, supra note 120, at 36.
125. Id. at 42.
126. Id. at 38–42.
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(the precursor to BancoSol) and ProMujer followed a microcredit
model not unlike that of Grameen Bank, including outreach to
the rural poor and lending to groups.127 However, with much of
Bolivia’s poor concentrated in urban centers, the first microcredit
lenders grew more rapidly in the cities and quickly became
profitable. The initial rapid growth of microlending in Bolivia
contributed to a measurable reduction in poverty.128
The government relaxed its banking regulations, allowing
nonbank finance companies to begin accepting deposits and
making small loans. The amounts of “small” loans rapidly
escalated; consumer lending for durables, such as washing
machines, began to be emphasized over microenterprise lending;
and new competitors took progressively less care to evaluate
borrowers’ repayment ability.129 Profit-oriented consumer loan
companies from other Latin American countries entered the
Bolivian market and began competing with more socially oriented
NGO microlenders.130 From the borrowers’ perspective, the
products of the two sectors were interchangeable, and many
borrowers fell into a debt trap, “bicycling” their loans by
borrowing from one lender to pay another.131 One study found
that payment defaults were highest for Bolivian borrowers who
went to both microfinance lenders and consumer lenders (39%),
compared with those borrowing solely from consumer lenders
(19%), and were lowest for microfinance lenders (11%) and NGO
lenders (6%).132
After the 1998 onset of the crisis, Bolivia’s GDP growth fell
from 5% to 1%, and the bottom fell out of the retail and service
sectors on which many microloan borrowers depended for their

127. Id. at 55–72, 82–91.
128. Paul Mosley, Microfinance and Poverty in Bolivia, 7–8 37 J. DEV. STUD.,
no. 4, Apr. 2001 at 101, 127.
129. Herbert Muller, Las microfinanzas reguladas en Bolivia [Regulated
Microfinances in Bolivia], 10 Tinkazos 71, 71–82 (2007), http://www.scielo.
org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&pid=S1990-74512007000100005&lng=en&nrm
=iss&tlng=es (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
130. See RHYNE, supra note 120, at 141–44 (describing these consumer
lenders and comparing their methods to those of microlenders within Bolivia).
131. Id. at 144–45.
132. González & González-Vega, supra note 56, at 63 tbl.XIII.2.
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economic activity.133 Loan defaults mounted rapidly and borrower
distress led to the organizing of a social movement. Between 1998
and 2002, several thousand borrowers formed various debtors’
associations and demanded forgiveness of debts.134 Many of the
protestors had borrowed from a single microlending institution
(Bolivia has many) called Acceso, which was shut down shortly
thereafter.135 Failure of this institution was attributed to its
grossly inadequate underwriting.136
In response to the social movements demanding debt relief,
the Bolivian government implemented measures in 1999 and
2001 to postpone payments on microloans.137 A number of the
consumer lenders eventually collapsed.138 However, not all
microlenders in Bolivia did poorly during the crisis. Several key
characteristics distinguished the microlenders that failed during
the Bolivian crisis from those that continued to grow and to
maintain low levels of payment defaults. Among these were:
•

low loan amounts and limits;

•

a “village banking” model, in which some interest is
set aside for emergency loans to borrowing group
members as a form of default insurance;

•

an integrated program of services that help ensure
borrower loyalty, including training, advice, health
services, and political education;

•

maintaining a careful screening process to ensure
borrower repayment ability.139

The strongest players in the Bolivian microsector, including
BancoSol, continue to operate profitably and provide credit to the
poor.140
133. Marconi & Mosley, supra note 122, at 250–51.
134. RHYNE, supra note 120, at 144–47; Marconi & Mosley, supra note 122,
at 246–47.
135. Valerie Rozycki, Lessons for Success from Microfinance Networks in
Bolivia 25 (2003) (unpublished B.A. dissertation, Stanford University).
136. Id.
137. Marconi & Mosley, supra note 122, at 241.
138. RHYNE, supra note 120, at 147–48.
139. Marconi & Mosley, supra note 122, at 244–46.
140. Id. at 241–46.
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The Bolivian regulators, Superintendency of Banks and
Financial Institutions (SBEF) and the Financial System
Supervision Authority (ASFI), responded to the overindebtedness
crisis with a range of regulatory measures. First, a system of
credit reporting was established to permit microfinance lenders to
obtain information about borrowers’ other outstanding loans,
with a view to responsible lending.141 Second, debt service was
limited to 30% of salary for employees.142 Third, ASFI now
mandates disclosure of loan terms, including interest rate,
whether it is fixed or variable, itemization of fees, and so forth,
similar to the U.S. Truth in Lending Act scheme.143 Finally, ASFI
requires every financial institution to provide a Service for
Response to Client Claims (Servicio de Atencion de Reclamos de
Clientes) to receive and monitor borrower and customer
complaints.144
The Bolivian lenders that concentrated on larger, more
profitable consumer loans to employees fared the worst, while
socially oriented lenders that focused on microloans for capital
investment appear to have survived the Bolivian crisis in better
condition.145 Proponents of microfinance lending argue that its
success depends on lenders differentiating loans for investment
from loans for consumption.146 The Bolivian regulator defines
microcredit as “a loan to a borrower—either an individual, a
business, or a group of individuals—for the purpose of financing
small-scale production, trade, or provision of services and where
the assessment of repayment capacity of the borrower is based on
the revenues generated by these activities.”147 On the other hand,
141. Autoridad de Supervision del Sistema Financiero (ASFI), La Regulación
y Supervision de las Entidades, Microfinancieras en Bolivia [Regulation and
Supervision of Microfinance Entities in Bolivia] 5 (July 6, 2010), http://www.
asfi.gob.bo/Portals/0/Documentos/Reg_y_Sup_de_EMFs.pdf [hereinafter AFSI];
JACQUES TRIGO LOUBIÈRE, PATRICIA LEE DEVANEY & ELISABETH RHYNE,
SUPERVISING AND REGULATING MICROFINANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL
SECTOR LIBERALIZATION: LESSONS FROM BOLIVIA, COLOMBIA AND MEXICO 35
(2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=776905.
142. ASFI, supra note 141, at 14.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Marconi & Mosley, supra note 122, at 257–58.
146. LOUBIÈRE ET AL., supra note 141, at 15.
147. Id. at 36.

CREDIT AND HUMAN WELFARE

1125

critics argue that a majority of microloan borrowers do not use
the funds for their stated purposes.148
It is not clear at this point whether the regulatory measures
(credit reporting, explicit debt-to-income ratio caps, and
disclosure) have prevented or will prevent overindebtedness and
future debt crises. Bolivia still faces an overabundance of
consumer credit with high default rates on the one hand and a
shortage of small-loan financing for microenterprises on the
other.149
B. South Africa
Shortly before the end of the Apartheid regime in 1994, the
South African government sought ways to attack the most
pressing problems of the black majority, including housing and
poverty. Microcredit was embraced as one tool to combat
entrenched poverty.150 A prior first step had been the Usury Act
Exemption of 1992, which removed legal limits on interest rates
for small loans, defined as less than 6,000 rand (about $1,000)
and for terms of no more than thirty-six months.151 The removal
of rate ceilings was not accompanied at first by any government
effort to fund NGOs to provide credit to the poor at reasonable
cost, nor was any consumer protection regulation initially put in
place.
What developed in the mid-1990s was a rapid growth of
thirty-day loan products, similar to the U.S. payday loan market,
and extremely high rates.152 Large banks quickly came to
148.
149.
150.

Haque & Yamao, supra note 19, at 12.
Muller, supra note 129, at 71–82.
PATRICK MEAGHER ET AL., MICROFINANCE REGULATION IN SEVEN
COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 63–64 (2006), available at http://www.micro
financegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.24382/26.pdf.
151. Reza Daniels, Consumer Indebtedness Among Urban South African
Households: A Descriptive Overview 2 (Development Policy Research Unit,
University of Cape Town, DPRU Working Paper No. 01/55, 2001), available at
http://econpapers.repec.org/scripts/redir.pf?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dpru.uct.ac
.za%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FDPRU%2520
WP01-055.pdf;h=repec:ctw:wpaper:01055.
152. See NATIONAL CREDIT REGULATOR, PRICING OF AND ACCESS TO CONSUMER
CREDIT: A REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT ONE YEAR AFTER
ITS IMPLEMENTATION 5 (2009) (showing short-term loan rates averaging 313%
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dominate the rapidly growing sector.153 Most small loans were not
made to entrepreneurs but to wage earners, based on the lender’s
ability to have access to the borrower’s bank account and
salary.154 Thus, the lifting of usury ceilings, a necessary condition
to microlending in the Grameen Bank model, did not by itself
result in Grameen-style microenterprise lending. Instead, a large
and profitable consumer lending sector arose, leading to
widespread complaints about a lack of consumer understanding,
excessive charges, and irresponsible lending leading to
overindebtedness.155 Harsh collection measures were used. For
example, many borrowers gave lenders bank cards and PIN
numbers and were faced with seizure of their entire incomes to
service accumulated debt, making them unable to provide for
their basic needs.156
The resulting debt crisis led to the enactment of the 2005
National Credit Act.157 The purpose of the new law was to:
[P]romote and advance the social and economic welfare of
South Africans . . . by:
(a) promoting the development of a credit market that
is accessible to all South Africans, and in particular to
those who have historically been unable to access credit
under sustainable market conditions;
(b) ensuring consistent treatment of different credit
products and different credit providers:
APR in 2002 and declining to 93% by 2008).
153. ECIAFRICA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MICROFINANCE
SECTOR FROM 1992 TO 2004: THE ROLE OF THE MICROFINANCE REGULATORY
COUNCIL 7–8, 21–22 (2005), available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/
p/site/m/template.rc/1.9.25161.
154. Id. at 27–28.
155. Id.; Cédric Ludwig, Trade Unions and Financial Inclusion: The Case of
South Africa 15–27 (Int’l Labour Org., Working Paper No. 51, 2008), available
at http://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Publications/WCMS_106330/lang-en/index.htm; Polly Mashigo, The Debt Spiral in the Poor Households in South
Africa, 2 INT’L INDIGENOUS J. OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, ADVANCEMENT, STRATEGY &
EDUC. 1, 13–15 (2006), available at www.indigenousjournal.com/IIJEASVol
IIIss1Mashigo.pdf.
156. Michelle Kelly-Louw, Prevention of Overindebtedness and Mechanisms
for Resolving Overindebtedness of South African Consumers, in CONSUMER
CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
175, 176 (Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 2009).
157. National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (S. Afr.).
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(c) promoting responsibility in the credit market by—
(i) encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance
of over-indebtedness and fulfilment of financial
obligations by consumers; and
(ii) discouraging reckless credit granting by
credit providers and contractual default by
consumers . . . .158

South Africa’s National Credit Act prohibits lenders from
entering into any “reckless credit agreement” with consumers.159
A reckless credit agreement means either that the consumer does
not understand the risks, costs, and obligations under the
agreement or that the credit results in the consumer being
overindebted.160 Overindebted consumers may seek relief from
reckless credit by first consulting a debt advice agency and then
applying for court-ordered cancellation or restructuring of the
reckless credit.161 The enactment of the National Credit Act does
not seem to have had a dramatic impact on loan approval rates,
which have declined somewhat, or on overall indebtedness, but it
is perhaps too soon to tell.162
Despite the enactment of the National Credit Act, South
African consumers continue to suffer from high levels of debt
stress. The National Credit Regulator reported in March 2010
that only 54% of active credit consumers were current in their
payments.163 Efforts to deal with overindebtedness through credit
counseling and repayment plans have had little success to date.164
The current picture of small-loan credit in South Africa remains
one of excess supply of consumer loans to salary earners with
widespread overindebtedness on one hand and a continuing

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. § 3.
Id. § 81(3).
Id. §§ 80(1), 81(2).
Kelly-Louw, supra note 156, at 190–91.
FEASIBILITY LTD., CREDIT EXTENSION TO HOUSEHOLDS: REPORT FOR THE
NATIONAL CREDIT REGULATOR 4 (2006), available at http://www.ncr.org.
za/pdfs/Public%20Report.pdf.
163. NATIONAL CREDIT REGULATOR, CREDIT BUREAU MONITOR 1 (Mar. 2010).
164. Melanie Roestoff et al., The Debt Counselling Process—Closing the
Loopholes in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, 12 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC
L.J. 246, 247–48 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1555214.
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dearth of credit for microenterprises on the other.165 While
interest rates have declined and collection abuses have been
reduced, it appears, on balance, that small-loan credit has not
increased the welfare of South Africa’s poor during the postApartheid period.166
V. The United States Experience—Payday Lending and
Incoherent Usury Laws
The problematic welfare effects of small loans and credit
cards in the United States on the poor have been written about at
length.167 One of the most controversial developments of the
1990s was the phenomenal growth of payday loan companies,
which largely displaced pawnbrokers and finance companies as
lenders to low- and moderate-income workers.168 Payday lenders
provide loans in small amounts ($500 or less) for short periods,
typically two weeks, at annual interest rates sometimes
exceeding 500%.169
The policy debate surrounding payday lending in the United
States has revolved around two issues: the high price of payday
loans and the debt trap problem, where borrowers continually
renew loans because of an apparent inability to repay them.170
The price and debt trap issues are, of course, linked, because the
high annual rates have less impact when borrowers repay loans
in two weeks or a month, but the costs are more likely to
outweigh the welfare benefits when borrowers pay only the
interest and postpone payment on the principal for longer
165. FINMARK TRUST & THE CENTRE FOR MICROFINANCE, UNIVERSITY OF
PRETORIA, A REVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MICROFINANCE SECTOR, 2009:
SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES, AND POLICY ISSUES 15–35 (Barbara Calvin & Gerhard
Coetzee eds., 2010), available at http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/1/3841/MF%20
Review%202009%20-%2021%20July%202010%20FINAL.pdf.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 6.
168. John P. Caskey, Fringe Banking and the Rise of Payday Lending, in
CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 17, 17–20 (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal
eds., 2005).
169. Id. at 18.
170. See id. at 20–21; Michael S. Barr, An Inclusive, Progressive National
Savings and Financial Services Policy, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 161–84
(2007).
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periods. Theoretically, even borrowers repeatedly using payday
loans might obtain net welfare gains. The empirical evidence,
however, suggests otherwise: payday borrowers systematically
underestimate both the costs of borrowing and their likelihood of
falling into the debt trap.171
Defenders of payday lending, on the other hand, challenge
the industry critics’ claims that the product harms borrowers.
Jim Hawkins, for example, contends that debt distress is not a
likely result of payday loans and other small-loan products
because the amount borrowed is limited and because lenders
verify applicants’ credit scores and outstanding debt (although
his description of product terms and lender practices is more
anecdotal than empirical).172 One study found that greater access
to payday lenders for borrowers affected by natural disasters led
to a reduction in bad welfare outcomes, as measured by
foreclosures and property-theft crimes.173 In other words,
emergency borrowing can help avoid shocks that increase
expenses or reduce income. Another study compared borrowers in
two neighboring states, one with legal restrictions on payday
lending, and found that access to payday loans may increase
employment or job retention and perceived economic wellbeing.174 None of these studies attempts to compare the cost of
payday loans with these welfare benefits. Studies finding either
benefits or harms of payday lending have tended to isolate one or
two borrower impacts for study175 rather than attempting a true,
171. Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive
Biases and Payday Borrowing 16–18 (Univ. of Chicago Booth Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper No. 10-01, Oct. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1532213; Parrish & King, supra note 6, at 15–16; Stegman & Faris,
supra note 6, at 13.
172. Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between
Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L. J. 1361, 1376–1401 (2011).
173. Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains? 3 (Univ. of Chicago
Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344397.
174. Zinman, supra note 13, at 13–15.
175. Bart J. Wilson et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Demand for
Payday Loans, B.E.J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y (2010) John Y. Campbell et al.,
The Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An Introductory Essay with
Four Case Studies 27–33 (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty
Research Working Paper No. RWP 10-40, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649647.
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complete cost–benefit analysis that would determine aggregate
welfare impact.
At present the United States’ legal framework regulating
small-loan lending is entirely incoherent. Usury limits vary from
state to state.176 Some state laws are displaced by federal law or
other states’ laws through “rate exportation”; small-loan
regulation varies depending on the amount, purpose, duration,
and collateral of the loan, and the license or charter of the lender;
and no state or federal agency has articulated a set of principles
for differentiating beneficial from harmful credit products.177
Interest rates are capped and uncapped in a schizophrenic
manner as regulators struggle with the competing claims of
lending industry and consumer advocates.
Usury laws in the United States consist of at least four
layers. The first, general usury ceiling, dating from the Statute of
Anne, typically limits interest rates broadly to low levels such as
5% or 6%.178 The second layer consists of the small-loan laws
adopted between 1916 and 1930.179 Small-loan acts were
prompted by calls for reform from the Russell Sage Foundation
and others seeking to legalize and regulate the underground
loansharking and salary-lending industry.180 These acts typically
require lenders to be licensed, limit loan amounts and terms, and
set rate caps at 24% to 36% per annum.181
The third set of laws was adopted in the states beginning in
the 1980s to permit higher cost lending to low- and moderateincome consumers. Laws authorizing rent-to-own transactions,
payday loans, and other fringe lending either removed all rate
ceilings or adopted very high levels of finance charges as the new
norm.182 These laws, like the small-loan laws a half a century
earlier, recognized the existence of strong consumer demand for
176. Campbell et al., supra note 175, at 31; Michael Stegman, Payday
Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 169, 176–78 (2007).
177. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 32, at 79–97.
178. CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR
THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 77 (2004).
179. Id. at 94–95; Drysdale & Keest, supra note 6, at 621.
180. PETERSON, supra note 178, at 95.
181. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT:
REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES 29–30 (4th ed. 2009).
182. Id. at 348–49.
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high-cost credit products and either removed all regulatory
impediments or sought to restrict only the perceived abuses at
the margin of “fringe” lending.183
Finally, the fourth layer consists of federal preemption, in
both the removal and partial reimposition of usury limits. Smallloan interest rates and terms are deregulated by federal
preemption in two ways. First, federally chartered banks and
thrifts are free from most state usury and credit laws.184 Second,
the federally chartered institutions may take advantage of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marquette National
Savings Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,185
which permits a national bank to comply with the law of its home
state while doing business in other states, in essence “exporting”
the usury laws of one state to others. However, for reputational
and safety and soundness reasons, federal regulators eventually
persuaded banks to exit the payday lending business by 2005.186
Congress also reimposed usury limits for some consumers in the
Talent-Nelson Military Lending Act of 2006, limiting interest
charged to members of the armed forces and their families to
36%.187 Although the statute was worded very broadly, Defense
Department regulations limited the reach of Talent–Nelson to a
discrete set of loan products, specifically payday loans, car title
loans, and tax refund anticipation loans.188
183. Id.; Mary Spector, Payday Loans: Unintended Consequences of
American Efforts to Tame the Beast, in THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER CREDIT
REGULATION: CREATIVE APPROACHES TO EMERGING PROBLEMS 107, 115–17
(Michelle Kelly-Louw et al. eds., 2008).
184. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 181, at 70–112.
185. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978) (holding “the National Bank Act, Rev. Stat. § 5197, as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 85, authorizes a national bank based in one state to
charge its out-of-state credit-card customers an interest rate on unpaid balances
allowed by its home state, when that rate is greater than that permitted by the
state of the bank’s nonresident customers” (citation omitted)).
186. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 181, at 150–53; FDIC, FIL-14-2005,
PAYDAY LENDING PROGRAMS: REVISED EXAMINATION GUIDELINES (Mar. 1, 2005),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil1405.html.
187. Military Lending Act of 2006, Pub. L. No 109-364, Sec. 670, 120 Stat.
2266 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987).
188. 32 C.F.R. pt. 232 (2012); Limitations on Terms of Consumer Credit
Extended to Service Members and Dependents, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,580, 50,585
(Aug. 31, 2007); see also Comments of National Consumer Law Center et al.
Regarding Limitations on Terms of Consumer Credit Extended to Service
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We can summarize U.S. regulation of payday lending as
follows. States first decided to allow small-loan lending at rates
around 36% in the 1930s, decided higher rates were needed to
facilitate payday lending in the 1990s, and were then preempted
as to both federally chartered lenders that could charge unlimited
rates and to military families by the federal government’s
conclusion that credit at rates above 36% APR to soldiers did
more harm than good. Most recently, Congress reaffirmed our
national ambivalence about regulating consumer credit by
establishing a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) with the power to prohibit abusive practices while, at the
same time, expressly forbidding the CFPB to enact usury limits,
whatever that might mean.189
Those states and regulators that chose not to limit interest
rates or that set very high ceilings have sought to mitigate
harmful effects of payday loans in other ways. Some states
impose repayment term limits but encounter practical difficulties
in enforcing such limits.190 In a market with many competitors,
consumers can evade a single lender’s prudential rules limiting
debt amount or period outstanding by borrowing from multiple
lenders. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) tried
to mitigate the debt trap in its 2005 guidance for federally
insured banks partnering with payday lenders.191 The guidance
stated that “[w]hen a customer has used payday loans more than
three months in the past twelve months, institutions should offer
the customer, or refer the customer to, an alternative longer-term
credit product that more appropriately suits the customer’s
needs.”192 Consumer advocates criticized both the FDIC guidance
and the more aggressive state restrictions on excessive renewals
Members and Dependents, 71 Fed. Reg. 70,512, 70,512 (proposed Dec. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation
/regulators/MLA-DOD-FINAL-2-5-07-A.pdf.
189. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 § 1027(o), Title X of
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517).
190. Florida, for example, established a credit reporting database for payday
borrowers and restricted “rollovers,” i.e., new loans to repay old loans, while
imposing a sixty-day “grace period” for repayment for troubled borrowers.
Spector, supra note 183, at 116.
191. See FDIC, supra note 186.
192. Id.
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and overborrowing as insufficient to prevent the serious borrower
harm caused by payday loans.193 Small-loan regulation will
persist in its incoherence until (1) there is some agreement on the
norms to be applied, (2) we agree what costs and benefits to
measure, if cost–benefit analysis is the norm, and (3) adequate
empirical study of the costs and benefits has been completed.
VI. The Role of Law and Regulation in Fostering Beneficial Credit
for the Poor
The microcredit experience of the past twenty years in
developing nations demonstrates that “mechanisms matter,”194
i.e., the success and the benefits to the borrowers of small loans
depends on credit product design as well as the uses to which the
credit is put. The experiences in Bangladesh, South Africa, and
Boliva, among others, also show that deregulation is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for welfare-improving credit for the
poor. In fact, the result of unregulated markets, as shown by the
examples of South Africa and Bolivia, is quite the opposite. Credit
products that do not amortize, that are not appropriately limited
in amount, and that provide no insurance against income shocks
may tend to drive out more welfare-enhancing products.
The empirical evidence shows that unrestricted lending and
borrowing leads rather predictably to debt overhang and traps
the poor in a cycle of borrowing to service past debt. Moreover,
payment of interest, especially above-market interest, has
negative distributional consequences, transferring income away
from the poor. Beneficial microcredit and small-loan credit have
observable and distinguishing characteristics, and the challenge
for the law is to devise credit regulation schemes that will foster
credit with these characteristics while minimizing the boom-bust
cycle of overindebtedness and the tendency of bad credit to drive
out good credit.

193. Hearing Before the Ohio S. Comm. on Fin. & Fin. Insts., 127th Sess. 5–
7 (Ohio) (statement of Uriah King, Legislative Associate, Center for Responsible
Lending), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policylegislation/states/king-ohio-payday-testimony-05072008.pdf.
194. Morduch, supra note 5, at 1572.
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To foster welfare-enhancing credit, regulation needs to
address the risks faced by low-income workers and
entrepreneurs: the risk of overborrowing and the risk of
catastrophic events that lead to default. Overborrowing risk may
be mitigated through credit-product design (e.g., requiring
amortization) and requirements for lenders to assess repayment
ability properly. Default risk and the costs it imposes on
borrowers could be mitigated by the development of suitable
credit insurance products.
The Grameen Bank’s success has not been dependent on a
rule of law model; while the bank has a legal charter, the terms of
its loans to borrowers and the means for enforcing repayment are
largely extra-legal. Its success has been due in part to somewhat
unique circumstances in Bangladesh that have prevented market
entry by less socially directed banks and lenders. Nevertheless,
credit regulation should be informed by several key aspects of the
Grameen Bank model that contrast with the forms of lending to
the poor that led to failure in South Africa and Bolivia, among
others.
First, the Grameen model implicitly incorporates several key
principles of responsible lending to protect against the risk of
overborrowing. Loan amounts start small, with repayment
required over a relatively short time period and, more
importantly, always with amortization of principal. Loan
amounts increase only as long as payment is made. In a study of
low-income credit card borrowers in the United States,
participants identified mandatory amortization over a fixed time
period and the ability to choose a credit limit as desirable
features of credit products from the standpoint of their own desire
for self-control measures.195
Second, insurance against the various disasters that
predictably befall the poor is critical to the Grameen model. This
feature can be mimicked through regulation encouraging or
mandating linked savings programs or fairly priced life and
disability insurance.196 Unfortunately, credit insurance products
in the United States have been plagued by excessive cost and
195. See Littwin, supra note 28, at 485–88.
196. See MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, SAVINGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS
OF ELECTRONIC BANKING 121–51 (1999).
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very low loss ratios because of various market failures.197 Another
form of insurance is the Grameen Bank’s policy of always
renegotiating and modifying repayment terms, while still
mandating continual repayment of principal and interest, when
borrowers get into difficulty. Regulation could require reasonable
workout terms for low-income borrowers, as the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) mortgage loan program now does for atrisk home loan borrowers in the United States.198 The 2005 FDIC
guidance for payday lending included a requirement that lenders
assist borrowers who were unable to begin principal repayment
within a given time period by offering an installment payment
plan at a reduced interest rate.199
Indeed, many of the emergency needs that prompt the poor to
borrow in the first place would be better met with reasonably
priced savings or insurance products. The microfinance
movement explicitly recognizes this by promoting not only
microloans for the poor but also the more comprehensive
provision of financial services.
Thus, the small-loan programs most likely to improve the
welfare of the poor have the following characteristics:
•

Responsible lending based on credit reporting: Loan
amounts are limited based on repayment ability, and
repayment ability is carefully assessed at initial loan
and renewal stages. Borrowers in repayment difficulty
have reduced access to additional credit. Credit
reporting is comprehensive so that any lender should
know the amount and terms of outstanding debt a
potential borrower is already carrying. While
borrowers have legitimate privacy concerns about
credit reporting, there is no effective way to prevent
overindebtedness without comprehensive credit
reports.

197. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 181, at 369–76.
198. Loan Modifications: Are Mortgage Servicers Assisting Borrowers with
Unaffordable Mortgages? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty.
Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 4–6 (2009) (statement
of Vance T. Morris, Director for Single Family Asset Management, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development).
199. See FDIC, supra note 186.
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•

Insurance and default mitigation: Borrowers are
forced to insure against default-triggering events
through, for example, emergency loan pools. The
Grameen Bank lending model requires borrowers to
set aside a small portion of loan proceeds for an
emergency fund to provide for repayment or
additional loans when group members face default
due to unexpected events.200 Many other insurance
mechanisms are possible, but the need for insuring
poor borrowers against unexpected events triggering
default is evident.201

•

Mandatory but flexible principal repayment: Loans
are always amortizing; that is, however small the
payment, it is designed to repay interest and principal
within a reasonable time period, and balloon or
negative amortizing payments are not allowed. Most
microfinance institutions have preferred to require
frequent periodic (typically weekly) payments. One
study has shown that such frequent payment
schedules are not necessary to ensure low default
rates among poor borrowers, and indeed costs can be
effectively reduced with a monthly payment schedule
without increasing the risk of nonpayment.202 On the
other hand, regular and frequent contact between
loan officers and borrowers is a common feature of
microlending that increases repayment rates and
limits overborrowing. Nevertheless, considering
successful microcredit programs with the debt trap
experienced by U.S. payday borrowers, one can see

200. Morduch, supra note 5, at 1585–86.
201. As Iain Ramsay has pointed out, another approach is to adjust contract
rules, to treat unemployment and similar events that prevent loan repayment
as force majeure and excuse nonpayment, i.e., deprive creditors of legal
enforcement of debts, thus requiring lenders to insure against these events. See
Ramsay, supra note 35, at 195.
202. Erica Field & Rohini Pande, Repayment Frequency and Default in
Microfinance: Evidence from India, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 501, 503, 507 (2008),
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rpande/papers/repayfreqjeea_1107.
pdf.
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•
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periods

and

Product differentiation based on use: While no
microcredit or consumer loan program can prevent
borrowers from squandering their loan proceeds or
compel them to make income-producing investments,
the fact remains that the use to which loan proceeds
are put will often determine whether the borrower
will be better or worse off as a result of the loan. In
the Grameen Bank model and similarly inspired
microcredit programs, some borrower training or
counseling is provided, and the use of the borrowed
funds is somewhat constrained or guided, with
preference for either entrepreneurial investing to
produce income or acquisition of capital goods such as
housing or durable goods. Loans for emergencies are
offered, but loans for chronic consumption shortfalls
are discouraged or denied. Direct regulation of how
loan funds are used is neither likely nor desirable. On
the other hand, credit regulation can and should make
distinctions among credit products recognizing the
differing consumer welfare impact of, for example,
loans for housing or business creation compared with
loans for short-term consumption needs. Borrowers
use some U.S. payday loans for emergencies, but most
are used to pay living expenses or other debts.203
United States consumer protection and usury laws
already differentiate to some degree between
business-purpose and consumer loans, usually by
excluding the former from consumer protection law
coverage.204

203. Martin, supra note 6, at 608–09; Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S.
Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 2009, at A45.
204. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (2007); see also
Laurence M. Katz, Comment, Usury Laws and the Corporate Exception, 23 MD.
L. REV. 51, 51–66 (1962) (detailing the history and reasons for a corporation’s
inability to seek relief under the usury laws).
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•

Reasonable and transparent pricing: Grameen Bank
established its interest rate (20% per annum) based
on social, rather than profit, criteria.205 For small-loan
credit to benefit the poor, interest rates and fees must
remain below the likely welfare gains borrowers
obtain by borrowing. In a regulated and competitive
market, the regulator’s role will be not to dictate or
limit pricing but to limit complexity, maximize clarity
in advertising and contract forms, and monitor
market pricing to respond to rent-seeking and
exploitation. In markets where pricing exceeds likely
welfare benefits, regulation should stigmatize the
products as risky and promote better alternatives.
VII. Conclusion

Once we observe that more small-loan credit is not necessarily
better, i.e., that indefinite expansion of loan volumes does not
obviously improve the individual or aggregate welfare of borrowers
(or lenders, for that matter), the task of the regulator becomes
clear. First, we need a set of tools with which to evaluate the
benefits and harms of small-loan lending, including the choices
and opportunities such loans potentially offer, as well as the
deprivation and misery that repayment and default can impose. To
that end, I propose borrowing from the human development
approach. Existing research offers some promising, albeit partial,
measurements of credit benefits, such as investment in incomeproducing activity, consumption smoothing, and protection from
emergency shocks to income and consumption. As for the costs and
harm side of the equation, a credit regulator can begin to provide
important measures by conducting periodic empirical and
comprehensive surveys of interest rates, as well as all other
charges and fees and other terms of small-loan credit, as the South
African regulator has done.206 To complete the picture on the costs
205.
206.

Morduch, supra note 82, at 245.
See, e.g., PENELOPE HAWKINS, FEASIBILITY LTD., PRICING OF AND ACCESS TO
CONSUMER CREDIT: A REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT ONE YEAR
AFTER ITS IMPLEMENTATION (2009), available at http://www.ncr.org.za/publications/
Pricing%20and%20Access%20Summary%20Cover%20June%202009.pdf.
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side, considerably more research is needed to measure and weigh
the variety of harms caused by debt default and distress and the
rate at which default or other bad outcomes occur for given credit
products and markets.207
Second, we need to consider the range of potential
interventions, including both ex ante regulation but also ex post
debt relief measures like bankruptcy, which are beyond the scope
of this Article. Regulatory strategies certainly must consider
displacement and substitution effects, i.e., the risk that reducing
the supply of harmful credit may cause borrowers to turn to even
worse products. This quick survey of the experiences of different
nations with small-loan credit is not intended to propose definitive
conclusions. Nevertheless, some ex ante credit regulation strategies
appear promising, including the broadest possible use of credit
reporting with responsible lending rules that limit excess
borrowing and reduce the risk of defaults, the provision of
insurance or repayment relief in the event of catastrophe, and the
requirement to always amortize principal in order to prevent debt
spiraling. Obviously, a fact-based regulatory plan will include
continuing measurement of the benefits and harms of small loans
as they are actually taken up in real markets by real borrowers.
The approach of the 1930s small-loan laws in the United
States was to link a liberalized usury regime for small loans to
consumer protections, including caps on loan amounts, and
restrictions on problematic terms such as balloon payments in
order to ensure that the resulting credit was beneficial. This
schema may simply need to be updated in recognition of what has
been learned through improved empirical research in deregulated
markets in the United States and around the world. The next
generation of credit laws and regulations needs to recognize and
encourage the loan product design features that deliver genuine
welfare improvements for lower-income borrowers while
discouraging rent-seeking exploitation, debt spiraling, and further
impoverishment.

207. See Caskey, supra note 168, at 36–37 (suggesting the use of randomized
experiments and ethnographic studies of individual consumers to better
understand welfare effects of payday lending); Porter, supra note 57, at 56–61
(describing various “dimensions for future empirical research”).

